Journal of Islami i l I ys ca connect ons, econom c act v t es, and t ca nst tut ons, many of wh ch ex sted ong fore twent eth century efforts to c ass fy ts op es n terms of part cu ar nat ona dent t es. 
Introduction
Still, we must remember that as a city, Jerusalem 1 is also a place in which people live, work, shop, worship, and play. Far more than being merely the contested terrain upon which seemingly contradictory nation-states struggle for i l I system known as ‗cap tu at ons', res dents us extract ons/nat ona st proc v t es other came under attacks from the Habiru. What would happen if the contending protagonists in the search for harmony in Jerusalem were compelled to recast their understanding of conflicts or tensions, and possible solutions to these prob-lems, not in light of questions about competing nations, but in light of questions about what might make Jerusalem a vibrant, democratic, and A World Class City? What if they cast their eyes towards the types of urban institutions and built environmental patterns that would host a vibrant metropolis, rather than a political arrangement that would sustain some form of state legitimacy and sovereignty? Rather than always being hamstrung by the -national question‖, might there be constructs of urban place and meaning to be imagined that could lead to peace, and by so doing, perhaps even help reconcile seemingly intractable national claims?
Jerusalem History in Brief
Archaeological findings indicate the existence of a settlement in Jerusalem in the 3rd millennium BCE. The earliest written record of the city to Egyptian records of the Bronze Age (Figure 2 ).
Figure 2. Ariel view of the Old City of Jerusalem
The city is believed to have been first built and founded by Canaanite peoples. During this Canaanite period, Jerusalem had the name Urušalim, meaning "the city of peace". From about 1600 to 1300 BCE, the city came under Egyptian suzerainty and was governed by Canaanite rulers who paid tribute to the Pharaohs. During this period, the city increasingly ancestors of Abraham. Further, the Bible mentions that the city was controlled by the Jebusites until its conquest by David, at a date subsequently placed at about 1000 BCE. David expanded the city to the south, and declared it the capital city of the united Kingdom of Israel. It thus became the capital of the Jewish kingdoms of Israel, Judah and Judea in the First Temple and Second Temple periods.
In about 960 BCE, Solomon built the First Jewish Temple. For about four centuries after the ten tribes split off to form the northern Kingdom of Israel, Jerusalem served as the capital of the southern Kingdom of Judah. After 70 years of captivity, the Jews were allowed by Cyrus II of Persia to return to Judah and rebuild the city and the Temple. It continued to be the capital of Judah and center of Jewish worship for another four centuries under the Hasmonean Kingdom. By 19 BCE, the Temple Mount was elevated and the Second Temple was expanded under Herod the Great, a Jewish client king under Roman rule. In 6 CE, the city and Iudaea Province came under direct Roman rule. The Great Jewish Revolt resulted in the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 CE. The city served as the national capital again for almost 3 years during the Bar Kokhba's revolt against Rome; it was sacked in 135 CE. For almost two millennia thereafter, Jerusalem did not serve as the national capital of any independent state.
The city remained under Roman and Byzantine rule, until it was taken by the advancing Muslim forces in 638. The rights of the non-Muslims under Islam were governed by the Pact of Umar 4 , and Christians and Jews living in the city were granted autonomy in exchange for a required poll tax. Whereas the Byzantine Christian authorities had not tolerated the presence of Jews within the walls of the city, the Muslim rulers allowed the reestablishment of a Jewish community.
In 1099, the city was conquered by the First Crusaders, who slaughtered most of its Muslim and Jewish inhabitants. A series of conquests followed: in 1187 the city was taken from the Crusaders by Saladin. From 1228 to 1244, it was given by Saladin's descendant al-Kamil to the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II. Jerusalem fell again to the Ayyubids of Egypt in 1244. The Ayyubids were replaced in 1260 by the Mamelukes, and in 1517, Jerusalem and its environs fell to the Ottoman Turks.
During the end of the Ottoman Period, when Jerusalem was a key node in the Islamic imperial orbit, there was no strict correspondence between nationality and place of residence in Jerusalem, a situation that created a delicate social and political equilibrium among the different peoples in the citybut that also prevented extreme violence. Under a i l I than an Islam/Ottoman identity were governed by their own laws and differentially represented by relevant local consuls in all city matters. One of the consequences of this legal arrangement was that no single nation-state was able to establish a religiously or nationalistically-based political monopoly over the territory of Jerusalem and its inhabitants. This rather unique situation prevented the development of large scale social conflict within the city boundaries, in spite of the open antagonism that many groups felt towards each other. Yet it also meant that European nations would need to adopt other means for imposing their imperial claims. One such strategy was to establish themselves as ‗protectors' of local noncitizens, a state of affairs which sustained the practice of continuous negotiation within and between local and international forces (mainly Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany, Italy/the Vatican, and the Ottoman government).
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These negotiations generally revolved around which national state's -clients‖ would be granted rights to occupy particular spaces in the city (especially those with primordial or contested religious significance). However, European nations also used Jerusalem's ambiguous legal and sovereignty status to further justify their rights to intervene on behalf of their preferred clients.
When the Ottoman Empire was not strong enough to fully expulse rival European nations, and imperializing European nations themselves could establish full hegemony over Jerusalem, this system of clientelis tic representation and negotiation kept extremely violent conflict at bay. However, when some of these nations began to feel more militarily empowered or challenged, this fragile diplomatic balanced was lost. At the brink of World War I, when geopolitical conditions on a world scale became unsettled and precarious, these vying nation-states soon sought to use their control over Jerusalem to strengthen their position in the global battle for hegemony. This was especially true with respect to Germans and their alliance with the Ottoman government, and with British military actions in the area (which included the creation of a detailed cartography of the area). The increased imperial and transnational power of certain European nations soon altered the way the space of the city was occupied. These transformations become most notorious in the period when British forces governed Jerusalem and imported their planning techniques, conceived in the European framework of exclusive nationalities. The spatial and ethnical mosaic and mismatch which characterized the previous eras was replaced by a conscious alignment of people's nationalities with specific territorial areas of Jerusalem. It is in precisely this moment that the binary social and spatial understanding of Jerusalem as being com-prised of Arab and Jewish populations (the same logic that later sustained the dividing wall) emerged -a dynamic outcome that can be traced to purposeful state planning action by non-resident forces who had little concern for the city as such.
The Old City of Jerusalem
Jerusalem plays an important role in three major religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, as well as in a number of smaller religious groups (Figure 3) . A large number of places have religious significance for these religions, among which the Temple Mount and its Western Wall (Figure 4) for Jews, the Church of the Holy Sepulcher ( Figure 5 ) for Christians, and the Al-Aqsa Mosque ( Figure 6 ) and Dome of the Rock for Muslims. Currently, there are 1204 synagogues, 158 churches (Figure 7) , and 73 mosques in Jerusalem. A policy of systematic and deliberate discrimination against the Palestinian population was developed in Jerusalem through land expropriation, planning permission and building laws. Like Apartheid South Africa, the Occupation uses a racist ID card system. In Jerusalem Palestinians hold "temporary residency" ID and are subjugated to discriminatory laws and taxes. Moreover, hundreds of Palestinians have these IDs revoked on a yearly basis, reflecting a common tactic used to drive Palestinians out of the capital. In a rapid amount of time the Occupation constructed an illegal settlement municipality of Jerusalem at odds with international law and the rights of the Palestinian people. Over half of the Occupation municipality today was not part of the city before 1967, but parts of Bethlehem and 28 other West Bank towns.
During the Oslo process new measures were taken to shut Palestinians out of their capital. Checkpoints were placed on the entrances to the city. Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank were refused entry. After the outbreak of the Intifada, Palestinians in Jerusalem have been forbidden to enter West Bank except for Ramallah. A steady exodus of Palestinian organizations and commerce began from the centre of Jerusalem into outlying areas such as Abu Dis, Ezawiya, Beir Naballa and AlRam so they could continue to operate.
The Apartheid Wall
Once the wall is finished throughout Jerusalem it will total 181 km ( Given that Palestinians rely on Jerusalem for employment, basic services, and education, the Wall is beginning to depopulate these villages as well as tearing families and communities apart. In the last few months 80% of the population of West Ezawiya village have deserted their homes in order to remain in Jerusalem. Out of a population of 5000 people, only around 1000 Palestinians now remain in this village and with the wall's completion they will be prevented from entering Jerusalem. The Wall around Jerusalem (Figure 9) Two new settler-only bypass roads planned for Jerusalem, will add to the grid which already exists in the city, connecting the settler roads southeast of Bethlehem to the roads to the north west. They will reach a length of 45 km for which 1070 dunums of land have been confiscated. This road will demolish at least 38 houses in Sawahra, Tour and Abu Dis. The Second Road (#16) will connect between the Ramot Eshkol Settlement to Maale Adumim and the other settlements in East Jerusalem. The length of the road will be 2.8 km (Figure 10 ).
Religious sites
The city hosts holy sites (Figure 11) 6. During the Oslo process, the municipality demolished 300 homes in East Jerusalem. 7. Palestinians are responsible for less than 20% of illegal construction in Jerusalem, yet suffer two thirds of the demolition orders.
The Politics of Planning
Israeli planning in Jerusalem is guided by the objective of maintaining a Jewish majority in the city. While the construction of Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem expands the Jewish population, restrictions on Palestinian development limit and reduce the Palestinian population.
Construction Restrictions
In 1999 the average Jewish population density was 1 person per room, the average Palestinian population density 1.8. To meet only existing needs many experts believe that an additional 21,000 units must be built. The Municipality grants an average of 150 -200 permits a year for Arab housing and demolishes 25-50 units a year. Between 1967 Between -2001 ,800 units were built in Jerusalem for Jews, most of them with government subsidies and 44,000 of them on land expropriated in East Jerusalem. Some 19,900 homes were built for Palestinians. Only 500 were subsidized. Some 7,000 are deemed illegal by the Municipality. Individual Palestinian families are forced to go through the permit bureaucracy on their own while in the Jewish sector experienced contractors apply for permits for large blocs of houses at one time. 
The New Visi on
Future Jerusalem was conceived in response to the deteriorating situation in the city (from the building of the wall to the accelerating and ongoing violence) and to the failures of Track I and Track II diplomacy, the latter of which may partly owe to the great inequality in power balances among the negotiating parties. As a strategy for generating peace and understanding, the proposal differs from conventional approaches in several ways: 1.
It focuses on the city, not nations, and in so doing emphasizes the uniquely tolerant and cos-mopolitan character of the urban experience; 2. It encourages imagination and vision, not the real politics of negotiation and political tradeoffs; 3. It proceeds under the premise that when given an opportunity to voice their desires and dreams about the city, most citizens -be they 
Methodological Aims and Assumptions
This proposal is a multi-disciplinary approach because it is certain that the nature of the city, and the way out of its conflicts, cannot be reduced to a single, negotiated view. In making this claim, we are reacting to the -consensus-building‖ approach to urban policy and problems now predominant in city planning practices, in which a shared commitment to negotiated problem-solving trumps all other approaches. In the case of Jerusalem, such strate-gies are sometimes part of the problem, leading to conflict over the terms and outcomes (not to mention perceived betrayals) of negotiation. Further, given the complex history and character of the city, those involved in negotiations are more often than not selected for their (national) political allegiances, not their urban loyalties, and thus do not fully represent the multiplicity of actors and views existing in the city. Thus, in order to break out of the stalemate that seems to have further reinforced despair and conflict, and that has served to relegate questions of urban livability to the back burner of national political diplomacy, we seek to bypass the standard route of negotiation between -representative‖ peoples and turn instead to the liberating and regenerative potential of imagination and vision. Rather than aiming for unity or synthesis among the competing parties in their plans for the city's future, the proposal encourages bold and ‗non-negotiated' visions of the city, with the assumption that only through such processes can we have a good understanding of the basic urban conditions on which most residents -no matter their religious or ethnic identity -can agree must be met. A second but related ideological pillar of this project is the deep belief in design as a more radical --and at the same time more subtle -mode of mediating or even transcending urban conflict. Following this logic, then, we do not work under pre-determined or politically motivated assumptions about national sovereignty or ethno-religious power, which then are rendered by urban designers in the service of negotiated political aims. Rather, we seek to encourage -non-negotiable‖ views of urban life and the city's future, both by its residents and others who might also accept Henri Lefebvre's notion of the -right to the city,‖ views which will then be given life and form through the sensitivity of urban planning and design. As such, this project implies a reversal of the conventional policymaking approach to urban conflict, which is often mimicked by designers. Instead of assuming that design serves as the technical realization of well-defined political i i i i l i space-i.e. they are not to be used for construction.
Journal of Islami i l I aims, we solicit the production of designs --or visions of the city and its built environment --that will be so imaginative and compelling as to transform or recast current political constraints. This might be accomplished, for example, by using design to realign or re-mix the social and spatial relations between persons or communities who in the real world of politics have found it necessary to define themselves on the basis of binary identities (be they Muslim vs. Jewish or Palestinian vs. Israeli).
The epistemological premise here is that because the city -or the urban built environment and the flows of persons, activities, and spaces that comprise it -lends itself much less easily to binary represen-tation, there are many more possibilities for arriving at democratically -subversive‖ or socially liberating urban arrangements and shared spaces through designespecially as compared to formal politics. As such, a provocative or bold new design for the urban built environment could be instrumental in producing a reframing of the relations between (binary) political actors, t limit what the city could be.
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The approach for Jerusalem is that it can temporarily de-link 10 discussions of the future of the city from discussions of the nation and national balances of power, in ways that might temporarily bracket some of the larger sovereignty questions that have kept political negotiators and urban planners alike from being able to think about what is best for the city and its inhabitants. This can be helpful on several counts, the economic as well as the political among them. After all, it is partly because national sovereignty concerns have over determined most of the policy and planning decisions for Jerusalem that the city -and the metropolitan region more generally --has fallen into startling economic decline. Jerusalem is now the most impoverished and economically distressed city in Israel, in addition to being the site of continual violence and attacks. Similar national sovereignty concerns also have played a role in the building of a wall that divides not just peoples but open spaces, and that shatters the longstanding social and spatial patterns of urban life that used to serve as the some of the few ways that Palestinians and Israelis would encounter each other on a daily basis: from use of markets to labor mobility to access to basic health and welfare institutions. But if people were inspired to think about the city in its own terms, and were free to imagine what kind of spatial, social, and economic practices or opportunities would be good for the entire city and all its peoples, not just particular locations, persons, or neighborhoods, they would un in this way could lead to a questioning of the anticipated and unanticipated consequences of the -national‖ logic that is partly responsible for the difficult conditions that now exist.
Conclusion
There is an ample evidence to suggest these types of direct negotiations among Palestinians and Israelis are extremely difficult to mount and manage, at least at the level of the city as a whole, and that consensus is often quite elusive. It took years for the contending parties to agree on the Oslo Accords (and more recently the Geneva Accords were almost as difficult), and here we are, decades into such experiments, with both urban and political conditions in Jerusalem looking more treacherous as time goes on. Moreover, some have argued that such representative but managed negotiations are often a part of the problem, because they raise difficult questions about who is entitled to represent an entire group of people in a negotiation about their future. There also are questions about whether this process really works well when there are serious historical and contemporary power imbalances between the players.
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For precisely this reason, some even have argued that the 2nd Intifada emerged out of citizen dissatisfaction with the leadership involved in the Oslo Accords, as well as resentment towards these leaders for being compelled to negotiate away or compromise on conditions in the city that residents felt should be non-negotiable.
The purpose is to break out of the impasses of the past, not to yield yet another mirror reflection of the sorry and highly polarized state of PalestinianIsraeli political relations, or yet another round of subtle diplomatic intricacies. One way to do this is to reject the a priori designation of participants only on the base of a binary Palestinian or Israeli identity, something that has been all but required in the participatory, negotiation, and consensus-building strategies for this part of the world. Such an approach has not only served to reinforce a pre-conceived, essentialist separation of actors into two distinct camps, thereby making it even harder for individual participants to find possible venues of collaboration or common interests. Negotiations conducted under this pattern of binary (i.e. Palestinian vs. Israeli or Jewish vs. Muslim) identification are also hampered by problems of legitimacy, since leadership cannot genuinely represent their supposed constituencies. And again, the inequality of power resources between these groups harms the validity of the negotiations in themselves. (neighborhood or community on the one hand, or the nation, on the other). In fact, we hope that assessing conditions and developing a project for this inter-mediate scale in itself will constitute some sort of analytical -not to mention procedural-breakthrough in producing new paths for peace in the region. However, when the city is the subject of study and action, it must be recognized to be a multi-disciplinary unit whose future cannot be determined only through political negotiation, and only through the involvement of folks whose identities are set on the basis of religion or ethnicity. Indeed, why wouldn't we invited negotiation -partners‖ on the basis of economic function, or spatial location, or any other relevant -urban‖ identity that is meaning-ful in the life of a city's inhabitants? The idea that a political consensus would be ‗naturally' translated into the spatial arrangement of the city reveals a deep misunderstanding of the inherently contested nature of urban spaces. Material configurations have their own norms beyond any policy imposed on them. Also, the city is not an abstract space which can be manipulated to follow a political project, but there is an inherent -urban‖ resistance to transformations. Last these proposed solutions can themselves be used at later stages for discussion, deliberation, and development of consensus about what is needed to enable either the particular vision or its implicit social justice aims. That is why we are hoping to solicit multiple visions, rather than thinking about what it would take to get a multiplicity of fragmented and competing forces (split within and between the two -sides‖) to actually negotiate and agree on just one view. The visions that is expected to generate are not likely to be restrained approaches conjured up in light of what is only possible now given the real politics of the current situation. Rather, they are bound to be idealistic if not daring conceptions of what a vibrant, peaceful, and democratic Jerusalem would look like. Rather than shying away from prescriptive, idealistic statements. It sees the value of offering utopian visions for Jerusalem as one way of enabling protagonists to think -outside the box,‖ with the expectation that such an exercise will help produce new or innovative options for the city which may have been overlooked because of prior constraints on framing the problem of negotiating the solution. Then we work -backwards‖ from these visions to understand and address the political constraints on getting there. By so doing, we hope to reverse the conventional teleology and prevailing practice as applied to the city, in which political negotiations always take priority, with designs or plans always the outcome of politically acceptable ‗solutions' rather th i i i
